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This article uses data from two experimental studies of two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma games
[1, 2] and compares the data with the theoretic predictions calculated with the use of a quantum
game theoretical method. The experimental findings of the cooperation percentage Cp indicate
a strong connectivity with the properties of a novel function (N ), which depends on the payoff
parameters of the game and the entanglement parameter γ. A classification scheme depending on
four quantum cooperation indicators is developed to describe cooperation in real two-person games.
The quantum indicators lead to results, that are at least as good as the cooperation predictions
derived from classical game theory.
PACS numbers: 01.20.+x, 01.50.Pa, 02.50.Le, 03.67., 89.20.-a, 89.65.-s, 89.70.+c, 89.75.Fb
Quantum game theory has its origin in elementary par-
ticle physics and quantum information theory. In 1999
the first formulations of quantum game theory where
presented by D. A. Meyer [3] and J. Eisert et al. [4].
Unknowing Meyers’ results on the “Penny Flip” game,
Eisert and colleagues focused on the prisoner’s dilemma
game. Within their quantum representation they where
able to demonstrate, that prisoners could escape from
the dilemma, if the entanglement of the wave functions
lies above a certain value. In 2001 J. Du et al. [5] re-
alized the first simulation of a quantum game on their
nuclear magnetic resonance quantum computer. The ap-
plication of quantum game theory on an existing social
system, namely the open access publication network of
scientists, was presented in M. Hanauske et al. [6]. The
authors showed, that quantum game theory could give a
possible explanation of the differing publishing methods
of scientific communities. A validation of quantum game
theoretical concepts by using experimental data of real
two-person games was addressed in K.-Y. Chen and T.
Hogg [7] (see also [8]). In contrast to the experimental
data used in the present article the authors of [7] used
an experimental design, which includes a quantum ver-
sion of the game. Our understanding of an inclusion of
quantum strategies in the players’ decisions is different,
insofar as we interpret the whole process of a real game
as a quantum game.
In the present paper, based on the Eisert’s two-player
quantum protocol [4] and the concept of quantum Nash
equilibria, four quantum cooperation indicators are de-
fined. By using these indicators to predict the cooper-
ation rates of real two-person games it will be shown,
that the quantum indicators lead to results, that are at
least as good as the cooperation predictions derived from
classical game theory.
MATHEMATICS OF QGT
The normal-form representation of a two-player game
Γ, where each player (Player 1 =ˆ A, Player 2 =ˆ B) can
choose between two strategies (SA = {sA1 , sA2 }, SB =
{sB1 , sB2 }) is the classical grounding of the two-player
quantum game focused on in this article. In our case
the two strategies represent the players’ choice between
cooperating (C) or defecting (D) in a prisoner’s dilemma
game. The whole strategy space S is composed with use
of a Cartesian product of the individual strategies of the
two players:
S = SA × SB = {(C,C), (C,D), (D,C), (D,D)} . (1)
The payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game can
be described by the following matrix:
A\B C D
C (c,c) (a,b)
D (b,a) (d,d)
TABLE I: General prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix.
The parameters a, b, c and d should satisfy the follow-
ing inequations [2]
b > c > d > a , 2 c > a+ b . (2)
In quantum game theory the measurable classical
strategies (C and D) correspond to the orthonormal unit
basis vectors |C〉 and |D〉 of the two dimensional complex
space C2, the so called Hilbert space Hi of the player i
(i = A,B). A quantum strategy of a player i is rep-
resented as a general unit vector |ψ〉i in his strategic
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2Hilbert space Hi. The whole quantum strategy space
H is constructed with the use of the direct tensor prod-
uct of the individual Hilbert spaces: H := HA⊗HB . The
main difference between classical and quantum game the-
ory is, that in the Hilbert space H correlations between
the players’ individual quantum strategies are allowed,
if the two quantum strategies |ψ〉A and |ψ〉B are entan-
gled. The overall state of the system we are looking at
is described as a two-player quantum state |Ψ〉 ∈ H.
We define the four basis vectors of the Hilbert space
H as the classical game outcomes (|CC〉 := (1, 0, 0, 0),
|CD〉 := (0,−1, 0, 0), |DC〉 := (0, 0,−1, 0) and |DD〉 :=
(0, 0, 0, 1)).
The setup of the quantum game begins with the choice
of the initial state |Ψ0〉. We assume that both players are
in the state |C〉. The initial state of the two players is
then given by
|Ψ0〉 = Ĵ |CC〉 =

cos
(
γ
2
)
0
0
i sin
(
γ
2
)

, (3)
where the unitary operator Jˆ is responsible for the possi-
ble entanglement of the two-player system. The players’
quantum decision (quantum strategy) is formulated with
the use of a two parameter set of unitary 2× 2 matrices:
Û(θ, ϕ) :=
(
ei ϕ cos( θ2 ) sin(
θ
2 )
−sin( θ2 ) e−i ϕ cos( θ2 )
)
(4)
∀ θ ∈ [0, pi] ∧ ϕ ∈ [0, pi2 ] .
By arranging the parameters θ and ϕ a player is choos-
ing his quantum strategy. The classical strategy C for
example is selected by appointing θ = 0 and ϕ = 0 :
Ĉ := Uˆ(0, 0) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, (5)
whereas the strategy D is selected by choosing θ = pi and
ϕ = 0 :
D̂ := Uˆ(pi, 0) =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (6)
In addition, the quantum strategy Q̂ is given by
Q̂ := Uˆ(0, pi/2) =
(
i 0
0 −i
)
. (7)
After the two players have chosen their individual
quantum strategies (UˆA := Uˆ(θA, ϕA) and UˆB :=
Uˆ(θB , ϕB)) the disentangling operator Ĵ † is acting to
prepare the measurement of the players’ state. The en-
tangling and disentangling operator (Ĵ , Ĵ †; with Jˆ ≡
Jˆ †) is depending on one additional single parameter γ
which measures the strength of the entanglement of the
system:
Ĵ := ei γ2 ( bD⊗ bD) , γ ∈ [0, pi
2
] . (8)
The entangling operator Ĵ in the used representation has
the following explicit structure:
Ĵ :=

cos
(
γ
2
)
0 0 i sin
(
γ
2
)
0 cos
(
γ
2
) −i sin (γ2 ) 0
0 −i sin (γ2 ) cos (γ2 ) 0
i sin
(
γ
2
)
0 0 cos
(
γ
2
)

(9)
Finally the state prior to detection can therefore be
formulated as follows:
|Ψf 〉 = Jˆ †
(
UˆA ⊗ UˆB
)
Jˆ |CC〉 . (10)
The expected payoff within a quantum version of a gen-
eral two-player game, depends on the payoff matrix (see
Table I) and on the joint probability to observe the four
possible outcomes of the game:
$A = c PCC + aPCD + b PDC + dPDD (11)
$B = c PCC + b PCD + aPDC + dPDD
with: Pσσ, = | 〈σσ,|Ψf 〉 |2 , σ, σ, = {C,D} .
QUANTUM COOPERATION INDICATORS
Dominant quantum strategies and quantum Nash
equilibria are formulated as follows:
(θ?A, ϕ
?
A; θ
?
B , ϕ
?
B) is a dominant quantum strategy, if
$A(Û?A, ÛB) ≥ $A(ÛA, ÛB) ∀ ÛA ∧ ÛB (12)
$B(ÛA, Û?B) ≥ $B(ÛA, ÛB) ∀ ÛA ∧ ÛB .
(θ?A, ϕ
?
A; θ
?
B , ϕ
?
B) is a quantum Nash equilibrium, if
$A(Û?A, Û?B) ≥ $A(ÛA, Û?B) ∀ ÛA (13)
$B(Û?A, Û?B) ≥ $B(Û?A, ÛB) ∀ ÛB .
We define the novel function NA of player A in a two-
3player quantum game by
NA(γ) := (14)∫ pi
θA=0
∫ pi
2
ϕA=0
NA(Q̂?A, Q̂?B , θA, ϕA, γ) dθA dϕA −∫ pi
θA=0
∫ pi
2
ϕA=0
NA(D̂?A, D̂?B , θA, ϕA, γ) dθA dϕA ,
where the functions NA(Q̂?A, Q̂?B , θA, ϕA, γ) and
NA(D̂?A, D̂?B , θA, ϕA, γ) are given by
NA(Û?A, Û?B , θA, ϕA, γ) = (15)
NA(Û?A, Û?B , ÛA, γ) := $A(Û?A, Û?B , γ)− $A(ÛA, Û?B , γ) .
A rather lengthy calculation gives the following result
for the function N (γ) := NA(γ) = NB(γ) of a two player
quantum game with a prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix:
N (γ) = pi
2
16
[(1 + 3 cos(2γ)) (a− b) +
(5− cos(2γ)) (c− d)] . (16)
An integration of N (γ) from γ = 0 to γ = pi2 leads to a
function (N ), that depends solely on the payoff parame-
ters (a, b, c, d):
N :=
∫ pi
2
γ=0
N (γ) dγ = pi
3
32
[a− b+ 5 (c− d)] . (17)
In the following N will be used as the main cooperation
indicator. It is easy to show, that the null of N (γ) is
given by a specific threshold value of the entanglement:
γ? :=
{
γ ∈ [0, pi
2
] : N (γ) = 0
}
γ? =
pi
2
− 1
2
arccos
(
a − b + 5 (c − d)
3 (a − b) − c + d
)
. (18)
In addition to N and γ?, two other other cooperation
indicators are added: γ1 is defined as the entanglement
barrier, for which the classical Nash equilibrium |DD〉
dissolves, and γ2 is defined as the barrier where the new
quantum Nash equilibrium |QQ〉 appears.
CLASSICAL VS. QUANTUM COOPERATION
INDICATORS
The evolution of cooperation in repeated games de-
pends on the payoff parameters of the game and the con-
tinuation probability δ.[10] Even though the theory of
infinitely repeated games has been used to explain coop-
eration in a variety of environments it does not provide
sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of
equilibria [1].
In the classical theory of infinitely repeated games the
standard lower bound on discount factors (δ) below which
no player can ever cooperate on an equilibrium path of
Γ(δ) depends simply on the payoff parameters b, c and d:
δ :=
b− c
b− d . (19)
Blonski et al. define a new bound on the discount
factors (δ?), which includes the ”sucker’s payoff” (a)
δ? :=
b− a− c+ d
b− a , (20)
The authors of [2] show that this indicator is able to
predict the cooperation percentage much better than the
standard indicator δ.
FIG. 1: δ? (dashed line, see [2]) and γ? (solid curve) as a
function of the payoff parameter c.
It is remarkable, that γ? and δ? are for a wide range of
possible payoff parameters quite similar. Figure 1 illus-
trates the similarities of the functions γ? (solid curve) and
δ? (dashed line) by varying the parameter c while keeping
the other payoff parameters fixed as in the experimental
settings of Dal Bo´ et. al. [1] (a = 12, b = 50, d = 25).
EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
Quantum theoretical results of the games used in [1, 2]
and their experimental data is summarized in Table II
and partly visualized in Figure 2. The experimental data
is based on the percentage of cooperating persons in all
rounds. [11] In the sixth column of Table II the experi-
mental findings of the percentage of cooperating persons
(Cp) of Blonski et al. [2] and Dal Bo´. et al. [1] are
denoted, whereas in the seventh column the cooperation
rank of the games is quoted. The last rank in experi-
ment [2] for example was found for game 2 (Cp = 2.8%),
whereas the lowest cooperation rank was achieved in
game 6 (Cp = 37.6%).
4TABLE II: Quantum theoretical results and experimental data of Blon-
ski et.al. [2] and Dal Bo´ et al. [1].
Experimental data of Blonski et. al. [2] and quantum theoretical results
Game No. a b c d Cp Rank δ δ
? γ2 γ1 γ? N
1 70 100 90 80 21.4 % 3 0.5 0.667 0.615 0.615 0.685 19.38
2 0 100 90 80 2.8 % 6 0.5 0.9 0.322 1.107 0.866 -48.45
3 30 130 90 70 15.4 % 4 0.667 0.8 0.685 0.685 0.785 0
4 0 100 90 70 13.4 % 5 0.333 0.8 0.322 0.991 0.785 0
5 0 120 90 50 37.0 % 2 0.429 0.667 0.524 0.702 0.685 77.52
6 0 140 90 30 37.6 % 1 0.625 0.786 0.641 0.481 0.615 155.03
Experimental data of Dal Bo´ et. al. [1] and quantum theoretical result
Game No. a b c d Cp Rank δ δ
? γ2 γ1 γ? N
1 12 50 32 25 7.6 % 3 0.72 0.816 0.759 0.625 0.798 -2.91
2 12 50 40 25 22.1 % 2 0.4 0.605 0.539 0.625 0.640 35.85
3 12 50 48 25 28.7 % 1 0.08 0.395 0.231 0.625 0.487 74.61
The next two subsequent columns in Table II present
the lower bounds on the discount factors coming from
standard (δ) and extended (δ?) classical game theory.
The last four columns sum up the specified cooperation
indicators calculated with the use of quantum game the-
ory. N is the most important indicator. Only if N is
equal for two games the indicator γ? should be used to
classify the cooperation rank. In the games 3 and 4 of
[2] neither N nor γ? provide distinguisable values. In
such a case one can use γ1 and γ2 to classify the coop-
eration rank, where γ1 is expected to be more impor-
tant than γ2 because in real two-person games decisions
depend firstly on the real strategy choices and only sec-
ondly on the imaginary part of the strategy choices. In
game 3 the classical Nash equilibrium |DD〉 disappears at
γ1 = 0.685, whereas in game 4 it vanishes at γ1 = 0.991,
which means that one expects to have more cooperating
persons within game 3.
FIG. 2: Percentage of cooperating players (Cp) in experiment
[2] (circles) and [1] (boxes) as a function of N .
Figure 2 depicts the percentage of cooperating per-
sons in both experiments as a function of N . The dia-
gram clearly shows, that an increase of cooperation comes
along with an increase of N .
It should be mentioned that the comparison of two dif-
ferent experiments is difficult, because besides the fixed
payoff parameters and the abruption rate δ other ex-
perimental details could influence the persons’ cooper-
ation behavior. For instance the distribution of the per-
sons strategic entanglement may depend on ethnological
characteristics or maybe influenced by the experimental
design. The information communicated by the experi-
menter himself could subliminally or even consciously in-
fluence the entanglement distribution of the whole group.
Fig. 2 indicates a small difference between the mean
of the persons’ entanglement in both experiments, be-
cause the cooperation percentage in [2] is always some-
what above experiment [1].
An increase (decrease) of δ influences the distribution
of the players’ entanglement, which results in an increase
(decrease) of Cp. The strong correlation between N and
Cp for the specific games remains.
Our work does not contradict the results of [7], but we
presume, that by implementing a specific quantum ver-
sion of the prisoner’s dilemma game, the experimenters
have increased the strength of entanglement of the play-
ers’ strategic decisions (and as a result the cooperation
percentage Cp).
CONCLUSION
This article shows that a quantum extension of clas-
sical game theory is able to describe the experimental
findings of two person prisoner’s dilemma games. A clas-
sification scheme was introduced to evaluate the cooper-
ation hierarchy of two-person prisoner’s dilemma games.
Four cooperation indicators where defined to predict the
cooperation behavior. This quantum game theoretical
approach was compared with predictions based on clas-
sical game theory and successfully tested for two experi-
mental settings.
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